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TRADE AND HEALTH
Threat of compulsory licences could increase access
to essential medicines
 OPEN ACCESS
Gorik Ooms and Johanna Hanefeld argue that low and middle income countries could increase
access to medicines by forming an alliance to credibly threaten companies with compulsory licences
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Access to affordable medicines and vaccines is essential for
both universal health coverage and meeting the sustainable
development goals. However, as innovations of medicines are
owned by companies, it is important to recognise that improving
access to them is intertwined with international trade laws and
intellectual property rights.
The sustainable goal development targets explicitly recognise
this. They include a target for increasing access to medicines
using the flexibilities to protect public health in the major
international trade agreement that underpins intellectual property
rights—namely, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1 However, many scholars
argue that the TRIPS agreement and the subsequent political
declaration designed to support countries’ access to
medicines—the Doha declaration—does not provide a solution
for the poorest countries.2
The main argument for intellectual property rights is the cost
of research and development. Some argue that for medicines
this should simply be financed differently—for example, through
prize funds financed by public resources. We agree, and in
September 2016, the United Nations high level panel on access
to medicines issued a report on promoting innovation and access
to health technologies. It recommended breaking the connection
between the cost of research and development and the end
product.3
The TRIPS agreement and the Doha declaration “solution” for
increasing availability of essential medicines has two distinct
advantages over alternative mechanisms: it is already included
in international law, and it has the political backing of the
sustainable development goal declaration.
In this paper, we discuss the difficulties that low and middle
income countries face when they want to use the Doha
declaration. However, we also argue that compulsory licences,
one of the flexibilities enabled by the Doha declaration, can be
used to increase access to essential medicines when used as a
threat.
TRIPS agreement
Intellectual property enables people and companies to benefit
economically from their invention. Only the owner of the
intellectual property rights can sell, or authorise someone else
to sell, a product. However, this monopoly enables the owner
to charge an unreasonably high price if they wish. As a
counterbalance, governments usually do not grant intellectual
property rights easily, and they limit the time for which they
apply.
The TRIPS agreement was introduced in 1995 and sets out the
minimum standards for intellectual property regulation in World
Trade Organization (WTO) member countries.4 Before
introduction of the agreement, countries could offer intellectual
property rights as they saw fit. Some countries offered none at
all, and many countries excluded medicines.5 In these countries,
companies were allowed to produce generic equivalents (copies)
of medicines that were protected by patents in other countries.
The TRIPS agreement obliged all WTO member states to
provide a minimum level of intellectual property rights.
However, it did not create a worldwide system. Instead, it set
out international norms for national intellectual property
protection systems. Each WTO member state is supposed to
create its own system but may work with others to create
regional systems.
A patent on a medicine granted by one country’s patent office
gives the company the right to prevent the production, sale, and
importation of generic equivalents in that country. However, it
does not affect the production and distribution of generic
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equivalents of the same medicine in other countries.
Nevertheless, since the introduction of the TRIPS agreement,
a company can expect to find similar intellectual property
protection rules in all WTO countries.
The original TRIPS agreement includes several so called
“flexibilities.” This is the term used for the leeway allowed by
the agreement for governments to design their own national
intellectual property system. One of the most important tools
for increasing access to medicines is the compulsory licence.
A compulsory licence can be issued by a government to a
manufacturer of generic products, allowing them to produce
copies without consent of the patent owner. The original TRIPS
agreement imposed conditions on the use of compulsory
licences, to avoid undermining the whole system. The precise
scope allowed by these conditions has been the subject of many
debates. For access to medicines the most important condition
was that the production of copies should predominantly be for
use in the country whose government issued the licence.
The original TRIPS agreement did not create a worldwide
system but a patchwork of (mostly) national intellectual property
systems. Therefore, a compulsory licence issued by the Rwandan
government has no validity in Canada, for example. As we will
explain below, these countries have not been randomly chosen.
A generic manufacturer based in Canada could not produce the
equivalent generic medicine for Rwanda. The Canadian
government could issue a compulsory licence, but it would be
for domestic use in Canada only. In truth, the Rwandan
government could issue a compulsory licence allowing only
manufacturers in Rwanda to produce generic equivalents.
However, if no manufacturers with such capacity exist in
Rwanda, the compulsory licence flexibility would be an empty
shell.
Effect on prices of antiretroviral medicines
The TRIPS agreement was made around the time that the first
antiretroviral medicines were developed to treat HIV infection.
In countries that were wealthy enough to subsidise the treatment
cost of at least $10 000 (£7700, €8900) a year for each patient,
these medicines gradually turned HIV infection into a non-fatal
chronic condition. Antiretrovirals were the first medicines to
demonstrate the effect of the TRIPS agreement. Some low and
middle income countries negotiated price reductions with
pharmaceutical companies, but these were insufficient to enable
combination treatment for everyone in need. At least three
countries—Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand—considered
using the TRIPS flexibilities to broaden access to antiretroviral
medicines.6
In 1995, when the TRIPS agreement came into effect, Brazil
and Thailand had already begun producing generic equivalents
of the first generation of antiretroviral medicines, which were
not protected by patent at that time. The TRIPS agreement
allowed low and middle income countries to wait until 2005
before implementing the agreement. However, under
international pressure, both Brazil and Thailand offered patent
protection earlier, and drug companies acquired patents on newer
antiretroviral medicines.7 Both countries considered using
compulsory licences. However, under pressure from
industrialised countries Thailand initially backed down, while
Brazil faced a request for WTO arbitration from the US.8
South Africa had already adopted comprehensive intellectual
property law under the apartheid regime. Thus the first and
subsequent antiretroviral medicines were protected by patent
in South Africa in the 1990s.9 In 1997, the post-apartheid
government had adopted the Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act. This allowed it to use another
important TRIPS agreement flexibility that enables countries
to import medicines without the permission of the patent
owner—namely, parallel import.10 A lawsuit against the South
African government was brought by the South African
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and 40 drug
companies. This resulted in substantial media attention and
triggered an international advocacy campaign for “access to
medicines.” By April 2001, the drug companies had dropped
their lawsuit against the South African government, and in June
2001 the US withdrew its complaint against Brazil.
The Doha declaration
Widespread criticism of the TRIPS agreement and its
consequences for treatment of AIDS led the WTO to adopt a
ministerial declaration on public health in Doha, Qatar, in
November 2001. The Doha declaration confirmed that
compulsory licences and parallel imports, as envisaged by the
governments of Brazil, Thailand, and South Africa, did not
violate the TRIPS agreement. The declaration also attempted
to deal with a problem highlighted by the international advocacy
campaign for access to medicines—namely, the challenge faced
by countries lacking domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing
capacity.
The Doha declaration recognised that “WTO members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of
compulsory licensing.” It gave a mandate to the TRIPS council
to expand the flexibilities,11 allowing compulsory licences for
export. This was initially temporary,11 but recently became a
permanent addition to the original TRIPS agreement.13 Here,
we refer to both as the “Doha declaration solution”.
As far as we know, the Doha declaration solution has been used
only once. In July 2007, Rwanda notified the WTO that it
intended to import a fixed dose combination antiretroviral drug
manufactured by the Canadian generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer Apotex. In September 2007, Apotex was granted
a compulsory licence from the Canadian authorities.14 Between
2008 and 2010 Apotex exported three batches of the
antiretroviral medicine from Canada to Rwanda using this
scheme.15 It was a lengthy and cumbersome process, and several
commentaries have questioned the efficiency and sustainability
of the scheme.16-20
Should we consider the Doha declaration solution to be a failure?
Is it a smokescreen, designed to give the impression that the
WTO cares about access to medicines, while trying to save the
TRIPS regime from a real overhaul? With only a single
application, it does not have much to show for 15 years of
existence. It certainly did not end controversy about high prices
and access to medicines. As mentioned above, the September
2016 UN report on promoting innovation and access to health
technologies recommended “delinking the cost of research and
development from the end product.”3 We wholeheartedly support
a fundamental rethinking of the concept of intellectual property,
but this is not likely to happen without consent of the world’s
most powerful states. Meanwhile, there may be reasons for not
dismissing the Doha declaration solution too hastily.
Hidden power of compulsory licences
The power of compulsory licences is most obvious when
governments use them effectively. However, compulsory
licences also have power when governments warn patent owners
that they will use them if necessary. For example, when the US
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faced the threat of terrorists using anthrax in October 2001, the
US secretary of health and social services wanted to stockpile
ciprofloxacin, which was the best available treatment for
anthrax. Bayer, the patent owner, demanded the usual price for
ciprofloxacin, but when the US and Canada declared they might
issue a compulsory licence, Bayer reduced the price.22 Neither
Canada nor the US needed the Doha declaration to threaten
Bayer as there was sufficient manufacturing capacity in both
countries (and the Doha declaration came a month later). Thus
threatening to use a compulsory licence may be as effective as
formally issuing one.
The Doha declaration solution is cumbersome to apply
effectively, but it does give countries— even those without
domestic manufacturing capacity— the power to threaten to use
a compulsory licence. This may have an influence on prices.
For example, sofosbuvir is a relatively new and highly effective
treatment for hepatitis C, but its high price in some countries
has proved controversial. Sofosbuvir came to the market in
2007. According to Iyengar and colleagues, the price of
sofosbuvir was $64 680 per treatment in the US and $539 in
India in 2015.23 In 2015, no country had issued a compulsory
licence for sofosbuvir. The first such licence was issued by the
Malaysian government in September 2017.24
Why the disparity in the price of sofosbuvir in the US compared
with India? The prices were set by the originator, or by generic
manufacturers working with a voluntary licence given by the
patent owner. Thus, the “discount” for India, given or allowed
by the patent owner, was 99% before any compulsory licence
was issued. This is similar to the price reduction of the classic
combination antiretroviral therapy, attributed to generic
competition.25 We cannot be certain that the risk of a compulsory
licence was the main reason for the patent owner of sofosbuvir
allowing a 99% discount, but there is no other obvious
explanation.
India has manufacturers that can produce generic equivalents
of sofosbuvir, as does Malaysia. Can countries without
manufacturing capacity use the same strategy? Before the Doha
declaration, patent owners would not have been impressed by
a threat to issue a compulsory licence from a country without
domestic manufacturing capacity. Since the declaration, such
a threat would be credible. Although the Doha Declaration
solution has been used only once, this was enough to show that
it can be done, as long as countries with manufacturing capacity
are willing to cooperate.
Low and middle income countries would be in a stronger
position if they declared their commitment to cooperate to make
the Doha Declaration solution work. One option might be for
them to agree on specific conditions under which they would
issue compulsory licences for export based on the Doha
declaration, if required by another member of the alliance.26
This would increase the credibility of threats to issue a
compulsory licence by countries without manufacturing
capacity. It would also give a signal to generic manufacturers
of the potential size of the market, if all countries participating
in this alliance would buy from the cheapest provider within
the alliance.
We should not be naive. As Sell points out, “there is a dizzying
array of extra intellectual property protection that is being
imposed on developing countries, such as TRIPS Plus
agreements, in the form of bilateral agreements, free trade
agreements, and plurilateral negotiations such as
anti-counterfeiting trade agreements.”27 The political pressure
used by rich countries against poorer countries to dissuade them
from using their rights under the TRIPS agreement and the Doha
declaration has increased. However, the governments of low
and middle income countries with manufacturing capacity are
not as powerless as before the Doha declaration. They can issue
compulsory licences for all medicines needed to protect public
health without violating the TRIPS agreement. They can declare
their intention to help low and middle income countries without
manufacturing capacity and, by doing so, empower these other
countries. Whether they have the will to confront the likely
political pressure is a different matter.
Key messages
Threatening to use a compulsory licence may be as effective as formally
issuing a compulsory licence
Although the Doha declaration solution is cumbersome to apply, it gives
all countries the power to threaten with compulsory licences
Low and middle income countries would be in a stronger position if they
declared their commitment to cooperate to make the Doha declaration
solution work
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